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THE POLITICS OF FAITH: RETHINKING THE 
PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL CAMPAIGN 
INTERVENTION 
Mark Totten * 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent attention to the role of religion in electoral politics has kindled new 
interest in what a church1 can say and do during an election season. Under 
federal tax law, churches and other charitable organizations receiving favorable 
tax treatment under section 501(c)(3/ cannot "participate in, or intervene in ... 
any political campaign."3 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the courts 
have interpreted this ban as both broad and absolute.4 It reaches not only the 
use of funds-an important means of regulating campaign finance-but also 
what a religious leader might say from the pulpit. Interpreting the general rule, 
the IRS draws a distinction between acceptable issue advocacy and 
unacceptable campaign intervention judged by a "facts and circumstances"5 test 
that encourages silence on the most pressing issues of the day. Moreover, for 
the first time ever, the IRS has launched an organized effort to enforce this 
prohibition, especially against churches.6 In February 2006 the IRS issued its 
• Visiting Scholar, The George Washington University Law School. Fellow, Yale 
Center for Faith and Culture. JD (2006) Yale Law School. PhD, Ethics (2006) Yale 
University. I wish to thank Anthony Kronman, Chris Ganski, and the editors ofthisjoumal 
for helpful discussions and comments on this project. 
I. Following IRS convention, the word "church" refers to a place of worship generally 
and includes mosques and synagogues, but not other religious organizations. The term "faith 
community" as used in this Article carries the same meaning. 
2. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). 
3. Jd See I.R.C. § 170 (2006) for the rule on charitable deductions. 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 19-38. 
5. I.R.S. Fact Sheet, Election Year Activities and the Prohibition on Political 
Campaign Intervention for Section 50 I ( c)(3) Organizations, FS-2006-17 (Feb. 2006), 
available http://www .irs.treas.gov/pub/irs-news/fs-06-17 .pdf. 
6. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PROJECT 302: POLITICAL ACTNITIES COMPLIANCE 
INITIATNE, FINAL REPORT (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/final_paci_report.pdf. "The PAC! represented a change for EO Examinations in how the 
issue of political intervention has been addressed. In years past IRS pursued those 
organizations upon the receipt of a referral but only where Examination resources were 
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final repore on a pilot enforcement program, the Political Activities 
Compliance Initiative (PACI). Of the 110 organizations investigated, 43% were 
churches. 8 The IRS expanded the program for the 2006 mid-term elections, 
toward the end of providing a rapid, targeted response to alleged violations. 9 In 
practice, this broad and absolute prohibition, together with the government's 
new effort to enforce it, places an unacceptable restraint on faith. 
One of the more visible fruits of this effort is the investigation of All Saints 
Episcopal Church, one of Southern California's largest and most liberal 
congregations. 10 The IRS has warned the church that it risks losing its tax-
exempt status on account of a sermon delivered a few weeks before the 2004 
election. The sermon described an imaginary debate between Jesus on the one 
hand and Senator Kerry and President Bush on the other. 11 While disavowing 
any intention to tell congregants how to vote, the rector criticized both 
candidates, saving his harshest words for the President. He concluded by urging 
the congregation to "vote your deepest values." This new willingness to enforce 
the prohibition against churches has forged an unusual alliance in opposition 
that spreads across the political and theological spectrums. 12 
I argue for a limited exemption from this prohibition for religious 
congregations. Several scholars have criticized the prohibition in the past. 13 
available. PAC! made resources available." ld at 25. 
7. /d. 
8. !d. at 9. 
9. "With the significant PAC! publicity ... organizations should clearly have an 
understanding of the rules and the message that the IRS is serious about enforcing the 
prohibition." !d. at 26. 
10. See Patricia Ward Biederman & Jason Felch, Antiwar Sermon Brings IRS 
Warning, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2005, at AI; Stephanie Strom, I.R.S. Inquiry into Sermon is 
Challenged by Church, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2006, at A IS. 
11. For the text of the sermon, see Rev. Dr. George F. Regas, Rector Emeritus, All 
Saints Church, If Jesus Debated Senator Kerry and President Bush (Oct. 31, 2004), 
http://www.allsaints-pas.org (follow "The Archives" hyperlink; then follow "2004-2005" 
hyperlink; then follow "If Jesus debated Senator Kerry and President Bush" hyperlink). 
12. For example, the conservative National Association of Evangelicals has joined 
hands with the liberal National Council of Churches in opposition. Jason Felch & Patricia 
Ward Biederman, Conservatives also Irked by IRS Probe of Churches, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2005, at Al. 
13. See, e.g., Deirdre Dessingue, Prohibition in Search of a Rationale: What the Tax 
Code Prohibits; Why; to What End?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 903 (2001); Alan L. Feld, Rendering 
unto Caesar or Electioneering for Caesar? Loss of Church Tax Exemption for Participation 
in Electoral Politics, 42 B.C. L. REv. 931 (2001); Edward McGlynn Gaffuey, On Not 
Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality of Tax Regulation of Activities of Religious 
Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1990); Richard W. Garnett, A 
Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REv. 771 (2001); 
Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions 
on the Political Activities of Religious Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REv. 875 (2001); Chris 
Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church 
Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 145 (2006). 
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Building on this discourse, this Article makes two distinct contributions. First, 
it offers an account of the unique character of faith as both total and communal, 
setting faith communities apart from other charitable organizations and 
sometimes demanding different treatment. Second, this Article looks to 
Congress and not the courts for relief. Most critics search for a judicial remedy, 
either as a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise Clause or under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 14 Relief from the courts, however, is 
unrealistic in light of controlling Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, the 
important policy concerns at stake and the potentially broad impact of an 
exemption make the legislature especially suited for this task. Toward this end I 
sketch a legislative proposal that seeks to balance the twin goals of removing 
governmental restraint on the practices whereby a religious community 
discerns how to live out its faith in the world, while at the same time preserving 
the important goal of regulating campaign finance. A critical look at the 
rationales supporting the prohibition opens up a space to craft a more narrow 
rule. Part I describes the prohibition and the rationales behind it. Turning to a 
critical assessment, Part II examines several problems with the prohibition, 
including its flawed rationales, its unacceptably vague standard, and the undue 
restraint it places on faith. Finally, Part III argues in support of a statutory 
exemption and sketches what this exemption might look like. 
I. THE PROHIBITION AND ITS RATIONALES 
A. SCOPE, PENALTY, AND ENFORCEMENT 
Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code identifies one set of tax-
exempt organizations, primarily those "operated exclusively for religious, 
charitable, scientific ... literary, or educational purposes." By virtue of their 
status, these organizations are both tax-exempt and qualify to receive tax-
deductible donations. 15 Furthermore, while most organizations must file for 
tax-exempt status and receive IRS approval, churches are automatically exempt 
if they satisfy the general terms of section 501 ( c )(3). 16 These terms include two 
restrictions placed on all 501(c)(3) organizations. In addition to barring 
"substantial lobbying,"17 the statute also states that a charitable organization 
14. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
15. I.R.C. §§ 170, 50l(c)(3) (2006). See generally BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF 
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 584 (8th ed. 2003). 
16. I.R.C. § 508(c)(l)(A) (2006). 
17. Although not the focus of this article, the Internal Revenue Code includes a second 
prohibition against "substantial" lobbying. A qualifying charitable organization is one in 
which "no substantial part of the activities . . . is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise 
attempting, to influence legislation." I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3). Although section 501(h) creates a 
bright-line "expenditure test" that organizations can elect to follow, churches are expressly 
excluded from this measure and must satisfy the vague "substantial part" test under section 
50l(c)(3). 
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must "not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing 
of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any 
candidate for public office."18 
The prohibition on political campaign intervention is wide-ranging. As the 
IRS recently explained: "Political campaign intervention includes any and all 
activities that favor or oppose one or more candidates for public office." 19 
According to the regulations, the prohibition covers not only "direct," but also 
"indirect" forms of intervention20 in national, state, and local campaigns.Z1 
Forbidden activities include, but are not limited to, "the publication or 
distribution of written or printed statements or the making of oral statements on 
behalf of or in opposition to such a candidate. "22 The church's teaching and 
moral deliberations are regulated the same as any other charitable organization. 
The regulations do distinguish between issue- and candidate-based advocacy,23 
allowing for the former. As we will see, however, this distinction often proves 
illusory. The IRS has also made clear that the prohibition is absolute. Although 
the restriction on lobbying allows charitable organizations to engage in limited 
efforts to influence legislation, the prohibition against political campaign 
intervention admits no exceptions.24 
Judicial decisions25 and several IRS revenue rulings26 have further clarified 
the scope of the prohibition, but neither offers much specific guidance as to 
how the prohibition applies to churches. Due to the sensitive issues at stake, 
18. I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3). 
19. I.R.S. Fact Sheet, supra note 5. 
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.50l(c)(3)-l(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990). 
21. Treas. Reg.§ 1.50l(c)(3)-l(c)(3)(iii). 
22. !d. 
23. Treas. Reg.§ 1.50l(c)(3)-l(d)(2) 
(The fact that an organization, in carrying out its primary purpose, advocates 
social or civic changes or presents opinion on controversial issues with the 
intention of molding public opinion or creating public sentiment to an acceptance 
of its views does not preclude such organization from qualifying under section 
50l(c)(3) so long as it is not an action organization of any one of the types 
described in paragraph (c)(3) of this section.) 
24. I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,441 (Sept. 27, 1985) ("We note that, unlike 
influencing legislation, interventions in political campaigns are strictly prohibited for section 
50l(c)(3) organizations. There is no substantial test for political intervention, rather any such 
activity will disqualify an organization"); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 1828, TAX GUIDE 
FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, 7 (2003) ("[A]ll IRC section 50l(c)(3) 
organizations, including churches and religious organizations, are absolutely prohibited from 
directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening in, any political campaign"); see also 
Ass'n of Bar ofN.Y. v. Comm'r, 858 F.2d 876,881 (2d Cir. 1988). 
25. See, e.g., Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Ass'n of 
Bar, 858 F.2d 876; Christian Echoes v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (lOth Cir. 1972); 
Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974). 
26. Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73; Rev. Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 C.B. 178; Rev. Rul. 
78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154; Rev. Rul. 78-160, 1978-1 C.B. 153; Rev. Rul. 66-258, 1966-2 
C.B. 213; Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210; Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2 C.B. 138. 
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only once in its history has the IRS revoked a church's 50l(c)(3) status.27 
Through various publications, however, the IRS has made clear that the 
prohibition applies equally to religious congregations?8 The underlying 
principle is that faith communities cannot say or do anything that suggests bias 
among the candidates. In addition to barring the transfer or use of funds on a 
candidate's behalf, the prohibition affects religious congregations in three main 
areas. 
First, the prohibition regulates candidate appearances. A congregation may 
invite a political candidate to speak at its events, but it must follow several 
guidelines. These include ensuring that no fundraising occurs and expressly 
stating that the event does not indicate support for or opposition to the 
candidate.29 The church must provide an equal opportunity to other political 
candidates seeking the same office.30 Second, the prohibition governs the 
issuance of voter guides and other printed materials related to a candidate? 1 
The guides must have as their purpose to educate voters and cannot directly or 
indirectly favor or oppose candidates. 32 Scorecards that compare the 
candidates' positions to the congregation's own shared values or offer an 
evaluation of any kind may violate the rule. 33 Furthermore, the guide cannot 
focus on issues of special concern to the community, absent inclusion of a 
broad range of issues that the candidates would address if elected to office.34 
Whether that list of special concerns is abortion, marriage laws, and school 
vouchers, or the environment, minimum wage laws, and foreign aid, a church 
violates the law if it gives special attention to the candidates' positions on 
issues about which the community cares the most. 
Lastly, the prohibition restricts speech within the faith community, 
especially statements by religious leaders during a sermon or other teaching 
that might favor or oppose a particular candidate.35 The limits described in the 
27. Branch Ministries, 211 F.3d 137. 
28. I.R.S. Fact Sheet, supra note 5. 
29. Jd. at 8. For application of this rule to a public forum where the organization 
invites several candidates to a single event, see Rev. Rul. 86-95, 1986-2 C.B. 73. 
30. I.R.S. Fact Sheet, supra note 5, at 4. 
31. Jd. at 10; see also Ass'n of Bar of New York v. Comm'r, 858 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 
1988); Rev. Rul. 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154; IRS Gen. Couns. Mem. 39, 441 (Sept. 27, 1985). 
32. I.R.S. Fact Sheet, supra note 5, at 9. 
33. Jd. 
34. Jd. Revenue Rule 78-248, 1978-1 C.B. 154 finds that a land conservation 
organization that publishes a voting guide for its members explaining where candidates stand 
on this issue violates the prohibition, even if the guide "contains no express statements in 
support of or in opposition to any candidate. While the guide may provide the voting public 
with useful information, its emphasis on one area of concern indicates that its purpose is not 
non-partisan voter education." Presumably, if the land conversation organization would also 
include several other issues, the guide would not violate the prohibition. 
35. The prohibition does not apply to religious leaders in their individual capacities, as 
any restriction of this kind would violate the First Amendment. 
The political campaign prohibition is not intended to restrict free expression on 
political matters by leaders of organizations . . . speaking for themselves, as 
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context of voter guides and other printed material apply in this context, as well. 
The statute prohibits not only endorsements, but any speech that might favor or 
oppose a particular candidate.36 Furthermore, the prohibition extends not only 
to efforts by the congregation to influence the public, but also reaches discourse 
within the community, where members together discern how they might live 
out their faith in the world. 37 Again, the IRS has made clear that the statute 
does not prohibit the community from speaking to important issues of public 
interest, 38 even taking strong and controversial stands. Addressing these issues 
in a manner that conveys either direct or indirect support of or opposition to a 
candidate, however, violates the law. 
Churches and other faith communities that violate this prohibition risk 
losing both their tax-exempt status and their ability to receive tax-deductible 
contributions.39 Furthermore, the IRS may choose to place an excise tax on the 
individuals. . . . However, for their organizations to remain tax exempt under 
section 50 I ( c )(3 ), leaders cannot make partisan comments in official organization 
publications or at official functions of the organization. 
I.R.S. Fact Sheet, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasis added). When speaking outside this context 
and in their personal capacity, religious leaders should indicate that their comments are 
personal and not intended to represent the organization, so as to avoid potential attribution. 
!d. 
36. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PROJECT 302, supra note 6, at 16 (Reporting the results 
of the enforcement pilot project, the IRS concludes: 
There were 19 instances in which a church official allegedly made a 
statement during a service endorsing or opposing a candidate .... Project results 
indicated that organization officials clearly understood that express endorsements 
are prohibited; however, some apparently did not realize that political intervention 
is much broader than just express endorsements.). 
37. In at least two places the IRS has indicated that one factor in deciding whether 
activity falls under the prohibition is the reach of the speech. Revenue Rul. 80-282, 1980-2 
C.B. 178 upheld the publication of a newsletter by a 501(c)(3) organization where the 
newsletter contained the voting records of congressional incumbents on selected issues, in 
part because the organization distributed the publication only to its members, who were 
dispersed nationally, and included only a few thousand persons. The ruling suggested that 
the newsletter would likely not have an effect on the election. In IRS General Counsel 
Memorandum 39,441 (Sept. 27, 1985), however, the IRS found that a voter guide violated 
the statute where its distribution was accompanied by a press release "with the obvious intent 
of creating widespread publicity in the news media." In its TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND 
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 24, the IRS makes no distinctions between speech 
deemed "political campaign activity" that is directed at the members of the community and 
the same directed at the public. 
38. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (as amended in 1990). 
39. Section 501(c)(3) organizations are only one of at least twenty-eight types of 
organizations recognized under section 501(c) and eligible for tax-exempt status but the only 
type of tax-exempt organization under the prohibition on political campaign activity. Except 
for a few very limited exceptions, 501(c)(3) organizations are also the only type of 
organization able to receive contributions that are tax-deductible to the donor under I.R.C. § 
170(a)(l). Even though other tax-exempt organizations are not under the prohibition, a 
charitable organization that violates it can lose both its capacity to receive tax-deductible 
donations and its tax-exempt status. 
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church and on the leaders responsible for any political expenditures.40 
Minimally, IRS action will involve an audit that may prove both lengthy and 
intrusive. The only instance where the government has revoked a church's 
50l(c)(3) status was the Church at Pierce Creek, which purchased full-page 
advertisements in USA Today and the Washington Times four days before the 
1992 presidential election. In opposition to then-Governor Clinton, the ads 
warned: "Christians Beware.'.41 The growing role of religious congregations in 
electoral politics, however, coupled with efforts by organizations such as 
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State to bring attention to 
alleged violations of the prohibition,42 has led the IRS to begin enforcing the 
prohibition against churches.43 
B. REASONS FOR RESTRAINT 
The legislative history behind the prohibition is sparse. 44 Then-Senator 
Lyndon B. Johnson inserted the provision as a floor amendment in 1954, 
without the benefit of congressional hearings.45 Most commentators have 
deemed Johnson's concerns parochial: a charitable organization was helping to 
fund one of his opponents in a primary election. Absent a clear policy rationale 
from the rule's inception,46 scholars and policyrnakers have filled the gap with 
various explanations. The four most common are the charity integrity rationale, 
the exempt purposes rationale, the subsidy rationale, and the campaign finance 
rationale. 
The charity integrity rationale worries that lifting the prohibition will harm 
these organizations' charitable function. The IRS has offered this rationale in 
recent defense of the prohibition as it applies to churches. Commissioner Mark 
40. I.R.C. § 4955 (2006); I.R.C. § 4962 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 53.4955-1 (1995). The 
IRS has statutory authority to impose an initial tax on the organization and personally on the 
leaders responsible for the expenditure at the rate of 10% and 2.5%, respectively, of the 
expenditure. The statute allows an additional excise tax where the initial assessment does not 
equal or exceed the amount of the expenditure. Note that this sanction applies to violations in 
the form of monetary expenditures and would not apply to many of the violations described 
earlier. 
41. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
42. The Americans United website provides an online form for people to "report a 
violation." Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Americans United: Report 
a Violation, http://www.au.org/site/PageServer?pagename=legal_reportaviolation (last 
visited Oct. 23, 2006). 
43. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 6. Investigations into alleged violations by 
churches must follow the procedures outlined in the Church Audit Procedures Act, I.R.C. § 
7611 (2006), which creates special protections for churches. 
44. For an overview of the legislative history, see Dessingue, supra note 13, at 905-14; 
Johnson, supra note 13, at 878-81; Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A 
Historical Perspective of the Penneable IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 
B.C. L. REv. 733 (2001). 
45. 100 CONG. REc. 9,604 (1954) (statement of Senator Johnson). 
46. See HOPKINS, supra note 15, at 584. 
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Everson remarked: "The worst thing that could happen here is that charities 
become vehicles of political campaigns; they lose the faith of Americans. 
Americans will stop giving if charities are abused. And then those in need will 
suffer."47 A recent report on the Political Activities Compliance Initiative-the 
new IRS enforcement effort--offers the same rationale: "If left unaddressed, 
the potential for charities, including churches, being used as arms of political 
campaigns and parties will erode the public's confidence in these 
institutions."48 A second rationale looks to the purposes of the organizations 
Congress placed in section 50l(c)(3) to receive special tax benefits. This 
rationale finds that political activity is not inherently charitable or religious and 
therefore the law should prohibit it. 
Supporters of the prohibition often point to the subsidy rationale: a broad 
bar against intervention in political campaign activity is necessary to prevent 
the government from forcing taxpayers to subsidize political activity to which 
they object. The literature makes frequent appeal to this rationale49 and the 
courts have suggested it on several occasions, as well. 50 The theory begins with 
the idea that tax-exempt status and the charitable deduction exist as an act of 
legislative grace;51 absent a decision by the legislature to provide these benefits, 
the income tax would apply. The theory then concludes that these benefits are 
the equivalent of an express "cash grant" from the government to tax-exempt 
organizations. Some commentators have suggested a strong version of the 
theory: government extends this favorable tax status because these 
organizations provide a service that the government would otherwise have to 
supply. 52 The limits of this version are obvious and more plausible is a weaker 
version: charitable organizations provide an important benefit to society, even 
if it is one the government may not otherwise provide. Both versions, however, 
assume that the tax-benefit functions as a subsidy and both support a broad 
prohibition against these organizations intervening in electoral politics. If these 
47. News Hours with Jim Lehrer: Taxing Sermons (PBS television broadcast Feb. 3, 
2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/religion/jan-june06/taxing_ 02 _ 03.html. 
Scholars give less attention to this rationale, see Dessingue, supra note 13, at 925-26. 
48. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
tege/exec _summary _paci _final_ report. pdf. 
49. See, e.g., JOHN D. COLOMBO & MARK A. HALL, THE CHARITABLE TAX EXEMPTION 
22-27 (1995); Feld, supra note 13, at 937; Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the 
Collection Plate-Never the Twain Shall Meet?, I PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 35, 80 (2003). 
50. See infra text accompanying notes 54-57. 
51. See Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389,395 (1953). 
52. Murphy, supra note 49, at 64. This strong version has support in the legislative 
history of the Revenue Act of 1938. A House Report concluded: "The exemption from 
taxation of money or property devoted to charitable and other purposes is based upon the 
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from 
financial burdens which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from other public 
funds." H.R. REP. No. 1860, at 19 (1938). 
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organizations could then support or oppose the political candidates of their 
choice, the taxpayer would in effect subsidize their political activities. 
The appeal of the subsidy theory stems in part from its appearance in 
several Supreme Court opinions addressing First Amendment claims, even 
though the Court earlier rejected the theory. 53 The seminal case is Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation, involving a First Amendment challenge to the 
lobbying restrictions under section 50l(c)(3). The Court made the strong claim 
that section 50l(c)(3) tax benefits are in effect a governmental subsidy.54 
Both tax exemptions and tax-deductibility are a form of subsidy that is 
administered through the tax system. A tax exemption has much the 
same effect as a cash grant to the organization of the amount of tax it 
would have to pay on its income. Deductible contributions are similar to 
cash grants. 55 
In a decision released the next day, Bob Jones v. United States, the Court went 
even further, suggesting a "vicarious donor" theory: "When the Government 
grants exemptions or allows deductions all taxpayers are affected; the very fact 
of the exemption or deduction for the donor means that other taxpayers can be 
said to be indirect and vicarious 'donors."'56 The Court's invocation of the 
subsidy theory in the First Amendment context has hastened its acceptance 
elsewhere as an underlying policy rationale for the prohibition on political 
53. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (rejecting a description of a municipal 
property tax exemption as a "direct money subsidy" to churches, which would clearly violate 
the Establishment Clause). !d. at 690 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Tax exemptions and 
general subsidies . . . are qualitatively different"). In subsequently adopting the subsidy 
theory, the Court did not expressly overrule Walz. Regan v. Taxation with Representation of 
Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 544 n.5 (1983) ("In stating that exemptions and deductions, on one 
hand, are like cash subsidies, on the other, we of course do not mean to assert that they are in 
all respects identical." (citing Walz, 397 U.S. 664.). 
54. In Taxation with Representation, the Court employed the subsidy theory to 
conclude that the prohibition against charitable organizations engaging in "substantial 
lobbying" under section 50l(c)(3) does not infringe on an organization's First Amendment 
right to petition the government. To avoid the problem of an "unconstitutional condition"-
the denial of a governmental benefit on a basis that infringes a person's constitutionally 
protected interest-the Court likened the tax benefit to a subsidy and argued that the 
organization did not have the right to lobby on the government's tab. Taxation with 
Representation, 461 U.S. at 546. The Court did not have to rely on the subsidy theory, 
however, to reach this end. As the concurrence concluded, and the Court later affirmed in 
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 400 (1984), "[t]he constitutional defect that 
would inhere in§ 50l(c)(3) alone is avoided by§ 501(c)(4)." Taxation with Representation, 
461 U.S. at 552 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Under this second statutory provision, the 
organization had another means to retain its tax-exempt status and still lobby. 
55. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. at 544. A decade earlier in Christian 
Echoes Nat'! Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849, 853-54 (lOth Cir. 1972), a lower court 
appealed to the tax subsidy theory, giving no mention of Walz, but instead discerning a 
general congressional policy. 
56. 461 U.S. 574, 591. Later cases have employed the theory, as well. See Texas 
Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989); Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 144 
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (invoking the subsidy theory against a constitutional challenge by a church 
to the political campaign prohibition). 
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campaign intervention. 
A final rationale supports the prohibition as a means to regulate campaign 
finance. Constitutional concerns and a long tradition of reticence on the part of 
the government to interfere in church affairs has meant the absence of almost 
any state or federal oversight of church financial matters. The IRS assumes that 
churches are tax-exempt.57 Furthermore, churches have no ongoing reporting 
requirements with the agency. 58 Lifting the prohibition, critics fear, would open 
an extraordinary loophole in campaign finance regulation, allowing otherwise 
non-deductible political contributions to become tax-free merely by dropping 
them in the collection plate. 
II. THE PROHIBITION AND ITS F AlLURES 
Applied to churches this prohibition is problematic on a number of counts: 
the policy rationales cannot support it, the IRS's interpretation of the 
prohibition is unacceptably vague, and most importantly, it places an undue 
restraint on faith. 
A. A FLAWED RATIONALE 
Although the campaign finance rationale is sound, it does not support the 
current broad and absolute prohibition, which covers various forms of 
expression within a church that bear only de minimis cost. Neither can the 
charity integrity rationale sustain it. The question of what hinders or advances 
the mission of a church, synagogue, or mosque is not a question that the 
government can or should answer. Nor is the concern whether the content of a 
pastor's sermon might weaken contributions to the church a governmental 
concern. These are questions solely for the church. Likewise, the exempt 
purposes rationale provides questionable support for the prohibition as it 
applies to churches. Although organizations falling under the 50l(c)(3) 
umbrella are routinely referred to as "charitable organizations," the statute 
identifies several purposes, "charitable" being only one of them.59 Under 
general rules of statutory interpretation, a "religious" purpose is not identical to 
a "charitable" purpose. The question becomes, then, whether a religious 
purpose might include activities disallowed under the current rule. As I will 
argue in Part II.C, the nature of lived faith does not allow for an easy divide 
between faith and politics, especially concerning expression on certain moral 
57. I.R.C. § 508(c)(l)(A) (2006). 
58. I.R.C. § 6033(a)(3)(A)(i) (2006) (annual reporting requirements). 
59. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (covering organizations "operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or 
to foster national or international amateur sports competition ... or for the prevention of 
cruelty to children or animals"). 
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and political issues. 
Finally, the subsidy theory likens the tax benefits that 50l(c)(3) 
organizations receive to a cash grant and concludes that absent the prohibition 
the government would force taxpayers to subsidize objectionable political 
activity. This theory falters on two counts. First, it is not obvious that a tax-
exemption and the ability to receive tax-deductible contributions amounts to a 
governmental subsidy. The Court's reasoning in Walz, a First Amendment case 
prior to Taxation with Representation, is useful in this context as well. In Walz 
the Court distinguished tax exemption from a subsidy: "The grant of a tax 
exemption is not sponsorship since the government does not transfer part of its 
revenue to churches but simply abstains from demanding that the church 
support the state."60 Moreover, even if these tax benefits did amount to a 
governmental subsidy, concluding that taxpayers are forced to subsidize 
political speech with which they disagree is implausible. The same reasoning 
the Court has offered in the constitutional context applies in the policy context, 
as well: the broad range of political viewpoints expressed from pulpits across 
the United States dilutes any claim that a taxpayer is subsidizing a particular 
position she finds objectionable.61 
B. AN UNWORKABLE STANDARD 
Aside from failures of rationale, a standard that prohibits actiVIties that 
"favor" or "oppose" a candidate for public office is unacceptably vague. The 
IRS has made clear that it must apply the standard on a case-by-case basis: 
"The Code contains no bright line test for evaluating political intervention; it 
requires careful balancing of all of the facts and circumstances. "62 Although the 
law often employs standards to capture subtleties that a bright line rule might 
miss, the costs here are too great. The law may silence faith communities on 
certain critical issues of public importance, while leaving religious leaders 
uncertain about where to draw the line. 
These costs are perhaps most apparent where the IRS seeks to police the 
supposed line between legitimate issue advocacy and political campaign 
intervention. The All Saints investigation is illustrative.63 Before describing the 
imagined debate between Jesus and the candidates, the church's former rector 
George Regas announced: "Jesus does win! And I don't intend to tell you how 
to vote."64 He then went on to explain what Jesus might say to the candidates 
on three issues of special concern to the congregation: "ending war and 
60. Walz v. Tax Comrn'n, 397 U.S. 664,675 (1970). 
61. Board of Regents ofthe Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000); 
Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
62. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PROJECT 302, supra note 6, at 1. See also Rev. Rul. 86-
95, 1986-2 C.B. 73. 
63. See Biederman & Felch, supra note 10. For the text of the sermon, see Regas, 
supra note 11. 
64. Regas, supra note 11, at 1. 
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violence, eliminating poverty, and holding tenaciously to hope."65 Although he 
never explicitly endorsed a candidate, Regas urged members of the 
congregation to "vote your deepest values."66 He offered no positive comments 
about Kerry, but the degree of criticism leveled at the President and his policies 
indirectly favored the Senator. At the same time, Regas did not criticize the 
President alone. At several points in the imagined debate, it was Jesus versus 
the candidates. On issues of peace and violence, Regas stated: "I believe Jesus 
would say to Bush and Kerry: 'War is itself the most extreme form of 
terrorism. "'67 Of course, Kerry voted for the war in Iraq and, though at times 
sending mixed signals, continued to support the war throughout the campaign. 
While the line between partisan intervention and issue advocacy is 
appealing in theory, the All Saints example shows that it is flawed in practice. 
The defect stems from the fact that the standard judging political campaign 
intervention is vague. As stated earlier, "[p ]olitical campaign intervention 
includes any and all activities that favor or oppose one or more candidates,"68 
whether that support is direct or indirect. 69 Although elections are always about 
more than just "the issues," they are always about the issues in some manner. 
The candidates, in fact, take on a symbolic significance and come to represent a 
medley of positions on various issues. Since the candidates are tied to certain 
issues, issue advocacy is bound to become prohibited political intervention 
under a vague standard that prohibits indirect political expression judged to 
favor one candidate or another. The more impassioned the speaker addressing 
an issue, the more likely a violation will occur. The easy distinction which the 
IRS trumpets, assuring church leaders they can still address the great moral 
challenges of the day without fear of government oversight, does not work in 
practice. 
Even if this line does exist, religious congregations are hard-pressed to 
discern where the IRS will draw it on a case-by-case basis. Although the past 
lack of enforcement means that some religious leaders routinely flaunt the 
prohibition, in other cases the result of this uncertainty is a chilling effect on 
otherwise legitimate speech.70 Addressing political issues, many religious 
leaders might conclude, is too great a risk. The vagueness of the standard, 
coupled with the severity of the penalty and the uncertainty of enforcement, 
makes a compelling case for revision. 
65. Id. 
66. Jd. at 6. 
67. Jd. at 1. 
68. I.R.S. Fact Sheet, supra note 5, at 2. 
69. Treas. Reg.§ 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990). 
70. See Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C. § 50J(c)(3): Practical and 
Constitutional Implications of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169, 180 
(1985). 
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C. AN UNDUE RESTRAINT ON FAITH 
The most weighty criticism arises out of the unique character of faith as 
both total and communal. These qualities set the faith community apart from 
every other charitable organization and render the prohibition a restraint not 
only on political intervention, but on faith itself. The law cannot bless 
everything done in the name of faith, but in this case the restraint is too great. 
First, the claims of faith are total.71 This is not to deny that for some people 
the experience of faith is something both genuine and less than all-
encompassing, perhaps even a series of rituals performed at a set day and time 
with few implications for the rest of the week. Nonetheless, the experience of 
faith for the vast majority of believers in the United States is an experience of 
something that places claims on every area of one's life.72 Certainly this is true 
for many Christians, who cover the broad swath of the American religious 
landscape,73 and also for many Jews and Muslims. That the lived experience of 
faith has this character should not come as a surprise, since faith concerns an 
understanding of the ultimate-the ultimate character of the world, the ultimate 
purpose for existence, and an understanding of God as the "Ultimate." God 
71. For representative statements, see the following: CENT. CONFERENCE OF AM. 
RABBIS, A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES FOR REFORM JUDAISM (I999), available at 
http://data.ccamet.org/platforms/principles.html; EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AM., 
CHURCH IN SOCIETY: A LUTHERAN PERSPECTIVE, available at 
http://www.elca.org/socialstatements/churchinsociety ("God's good and just demands 
address people in the obligations of their relationships and the challenges of the world."); 
NAT'L Ass'N OF EVANGELICALS, FOR THE HEALTH OF THE NATION: AN EVANGELICAL CALL 
TO CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.nae.net/images/civic _responsibility2.pdf ("We ... engage in public life because 
Jesus is Lord over every area of life."); POPE JOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR pt. 4 
(1993), available at 
http://www. vatican. valholy _father/john _paul_ ii/encyclicals/documentslhf jp-
ii_ enc _ 06081993 _ veritatis-splendor _ en.html ("the Popes ... have developed and proposed a 
moral teaching regarding the many different spheres of human life."); PRESBYTERIAN 
CHURCH (U.S.A.), WHY AND HOW THE CHURCH MAKES A SOCIAL POLICY WITNESS pt. I 
(1993), available at http://www.pcusa.org/acswp/index.htm (follow "Presbyterian Social 
Witness Policy Compilation" hyperlink; then follow "1993 Statement- PC(USA), pp. 780-
781" hyperlink) ("In [the church], discernment of God's will for all human life, including the 
public realm, takes place."); S. BAPTIST CONVENTION, THE BAPTIST FAITH AND MESSAGE pt. 
XV (2000), available at http://www.sbc.net/bfrnlbfm2000.asp ("All Christians are under 
obligation to seek to make the will of Christ supreme in our own lives and in human society . 
. . . Every Christian should seek to bring industry, government, and society as a whole under 
the sway of the principles of righteousness, truth, and brotherly love."). The totality of the 
claims that Islam places upon believers appears throughout the Qur'an, especially in the 
concept of "submission" (the root of Islam means "submission"). See, for example, 6: 162-
163, where the Qur'an instructs the Prophet: "Say (0 Muhammad) my prayer, my sacrifice, 
my life and my death belong to Allah; He has no partner and I am ordered to be among those 
who submit (Muslims)." 
72. See supra note 71. 
73. For demographic information on the religious traditions in America, see the 
website ofThe Association of Religion Data Archives: http://www.thearda.com. 
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exists as the final source of allegiance-above family, friends, co-patriots, and 
the state. Faith traditions, in particular those of Christianity, Judaism, and 
Islam, have cosmologies (narratives about beginnings) and eschato/ogies 
(narratives about last things), which shape everything in between and together 
cast a theological vision for possibilities and responsibilities in this world. 
Consequently, faith touches every area of life. This is not to suggest that 
persons within the traditions always have a shared understanding of how to live 
out that faith in the world. How persons of faith and the communities they form 
construe sacred texts, other writings and narratives in the tradition, empirical 
knowledge, and their own experience to arrive at a shared ethic will differ from 
one community to the next, and voices from within will dissent. Nonetheless, 
the all-encompassing character of faith remains. It reaches life and death, 
sexuality, marriage, vocation, suffering, war and peace, the environment, and 
certainly politics where members of a society seek to forge a workable 
compromise on these and many other issues of pressing social concern. The 
1934 Barmen Declaration,74 issued by the German Evangelical Church one 
year after Hitler seized power, was a momentous statement of the total claim 
that faith places upon the believer. The Declaration voiced opposition to Nazi 
rule, which sought either to silence or subvert the church for its own 
nationalistic purposes.75 Rejecting both options, the signers declared: "We 
reject the false doctrine, as though there were areas of our life in which we 
would not belong to Jesus Christ, but to other lords .... "76 
Second, the practice of faith is also communal.77 The faith community 
often plays a vital role in shaping how a person lives out her faith in the world. 
For most Christians, Jews, and Muslims, and for many persons of other 
traditions as well, faith is not a solo experience. Believers usually do not settle 
on a set of favored beliefs and practices and then look for others with a similar 
list. Many are born into a faith community, or join one with more questions 
than answers. Faith takes shape within the bounds of a particular community-
First Baptist Church, the Congregation of Moses, or the Islamic Center of 
Greenwood-and within a particular denomination or sect-Catholicism, 
74. CONFESSING CHURCH, THEOLOGICAL DECLARATION OF BARMEN (1934), available 
at http://www .creeds.net/reformed/barmen.htm. 
75. ld. 
76. ld. at "1!8.15. 
77. See, e.g., EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN CHURCH IN AM., supra note 71 ("As a 
community of moral deliberation, the church seeks to 'discern what is the will of God' .... 
Christians struggle together on social questions in order to know better how to live faithfully 
and responsibly in their callings."); MENNONITE CHURCH U.S.A., CONFESSION OF FAITH IN A 
MENNONITE PERSPECTIVE Art. IX (1995), available at http://www.mcusa-
archives.org/library/resolutions/1995/index.html ("The church is the assembly of those who 
voluntarily commit themselves to follow Christ .... [T]he church ... seeks to discern God's 
will."); PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (U.S.A.), supra note 71 (Under the heading "The Church as 
a Community of Discernment," the document concludes: "In this community, discernment of 
God's will for all human life, including the public realm, takes place."). 
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Reformed Judaism, or Sunni Islam. 
How communities discern the implications of their faith will vary. For 
some traditions, guidance may come from an ordered hierarchy within the 
tradition. The papal encyclical Evangelium Vitae (1995) provides authoritative 
teaching for Catholics on issues of abortion and euthanasia.78 While individual 
Catholics may reject this teaching, it remains authoritative within the Church. 
A local faith community may gather to discern guidance on particular issues. 
Special services of prayer and reflection during times of war may function not 
only to express the commitments of the community, but also to form them. 
More often, the process by which the community shapes its practice of faith is 
less formal. Through the breaking of bread, communal prayers, reading from 
sacred texts, meeting in small groups, celebrating holy days, sharing in 
worship, participating in the liturgy, teaching and preaching, and other 
practices the community arrives at a shared understanding of how it might live 
out its faith in the world. This is not to say that the community is the only 
source of moral formation, or that individuals never dissent. Rather, the point is 
that the community plays a central role in shaping the practice of faith. Lived 
faith is almost always a shared experience. 
These marks of faith as both total and communal set faith communities 
apart from other charitable organizations and explain why the broad prohibition 
is so injurious when applied to churches, synagogues, and mosques. The shared 
interest in one or more related issues that brings people together to advance the 
purposes of a charitable organization is unlike the total claim that faith places 
upon members of a religious community. Even where a person is so devoted to 
a particular cause that it consumes all of her time and energy, seldom does the 
cause present itself as an all-encompassing claim on the self, rooted in an 
account of the ultimate (and if it does, it is perhaps better described with 
religious language). The difference is that the claims of one are total, the claims 
of the other are not. The American Cancer Society, the Museum of Modern Art 
(MOMA), and The Nature Conservancy are filled with people devoted to 
cancer research, the arts, and land conservation, but their posture toward their 
cause is qualitatively different from the posture of many believers toward their 
religious traditions and the commitments they represent. Members of The 
Nature Conservancy join together out of a shared commitment "to preserve the 
plants, animals and natural communities that represent the diversity of life on 
Earth;"79 members of the Presbyterian Church of America join together out of a 
shared commitment to live "all aspects of our lives ... to the glory of God 
under the Lordship of Jesus Christ."80 
The very fact that the claims of faith are total means that faith is 
intrinsically political. This does not mean (and in America rarely is the case) 
78. POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE (Mar. 25 1995). 
79. The Nature Conservancy, Our Mission, http://www.nature.org/aboutus/. 
80. Presbyterian Church in America, What We Believe, 
http://www. pcanet.org/ general/beliefs.htm. 
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that believers aspire for theocracy, but it does mean that their participation in 
American political life may be as much an exercise of faith as reciting a sacred 
text or celebrating a holy day. Committed followers of the same faith, and even 
the same local faith community, may disagree on the issues and the candidates 
who represent them; nonetheless faith has much to say about what they do the 
first Tuesday of November. While cancer research, the arts, and land 
conservation are each important issues, perhaps even the primary issue that a 
person might weigh in deciding how to cast her vote, faith is a lens that shapes 
how a person perceives every issue. The problem with the prohibition arises 
because the claims of faith are not only total, but at the same time the practice 
of faith is also communal. If the community is the locus of moral discernment, 
a primary location where believers discern the total claims of faith, then a 
prohibition that cordons off one area of life and effectively demands collective 
silence is a restraint on faith itself. 
III. TOWARD LEGISLATIVE REVISION 
As it now stands, this broad prohibition as applied to churches fails 
because of its flawed rationale, its unworkable standard, and especially the 
undue restraint it places on faith. The burden it places on these communities 
promises to swell as the IRS continues to enforce the prohibition against them. 
These failures make a strong case for a carefully drawn, limited exemption for 
faith communities. While the government has reason to prohibit the use of 
funds for political campaign activity, it should not regulate the practices 
whereby a faith community discerns how it might live out its faith. This Part 
argues that Congress should act and sketches the outline of a legislative 
exemption. First, however, it is important to consider two alternatives and why 
they fail to remedy the problem. 
A. THE ABSENCE OF ALTERNATIVES 
One alternative to an exemption is that religious congregations might 
simply relinquish their favored tax status as the cost for political voice. 
Although the Court has never considered a constitutional or statutory challenge 
to the broad prohibition on political campaign activity as it applies to churches, 
it suggested this alternative in Regan v. Taxation with Representation. 81 
Donations do not generally count as taxable income, 82 so the church would not 
81. See Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983) (addressing 
the prohibition in 50l(c)(3) against "substantial lobbying," the Court employed the subsidy 
theory to conclude: "The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible 
contributions to support its nonlobbying activity .... Congress has merely refused to pay for 
the lobbying out of public moneys."). 
82. As the D.C. Circuit concluded in Branch Ministries v. Rosotti, which involved a 
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suddenly shoulder a sizable tax burden. Moreover, the loss of the charitable 
deduction only affects persons who itemize their deductions.83 Nonetheless, the 
impact of losing the ability to receive tax-deductible donations is real, since 
more than 94% of the revenue for religious congregations comes from 
individuals.84 Absent a defensible rationale for this broad prohibition, faith 
communities rightly hesitate to lose the charitable deduction. 
While the Court affirmed this alternative for a public interest group, it also 
raises potential constitutional problems when applied to religious 
congregations. As a widespread remedy this alternative would impose an 
unprecedented85 and perhaps unconstitutional entanglement of the state with 
religion. In Walz, the Court considered an Establishment Clause challenge to 
New York City's property tax exemption as it applied to religious 
organizations. 86 Turning to the question of government entanglement, the Court 
observed: "Either course, taxation of churches or exemption, occasions some 
degree of involvement with religion. Elimination of exemption would tend to 
expand the involvement of government by giving rise to [assorted government 
claims] and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of 
those legal processes."87 
Under a second alternative, a church would operate two organizations: a 
501(c)(3) organization for most of its activities and a separate but related 
501(c)(4) organization for political activities.88 Again, the Court opened the 
door to this possible alternative in Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 89 
and in Branch Ministries v. Rossotti the D.C. Circuit described a similar 
kind of constitutional challenge that has never reached the Court, "the revocation of the 
exemption does not convert bona fide donations into income taxable to the Church." Branch 
Ministries v. Rosotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000). See also 26 U.S.C. § 102(a) 
(2006) ("Gross income does not include the value of property acquired by gift .... "). 
83. For the 2003 tax year, itemized deductions were claimed on 33.7% of all 
individual income tax returns. MICHAEL PARISI & SCOTT HOLLENBECK, INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERV., INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 2003, at 12 (2004), available at 
http://www. irs.gov /pub/irs-soi/03 indtr. pdf. 
84. INDEP. SECTOR, AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS CONGREGATIONS: MEASURING THEIR 
CONTRIBUTION TO SOCIETY 4 (2000), available at 
http://www.independentsector.org/programs/research/ReligiousCong.pdf. 
85. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) ("For so long as 
federal income taxes have had any potential impact on churches--over 75 years-religious 
organizations have been expressly exempt from the tax."); Murphy, supra note 49, at 41-46; 
John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional 
Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REv. 521 (1991-92). 
86. Walz, 397 U.S. 664. 
87. Id. at 674. See also Whitehead, supra note 85. At the same time, and without 
making clear whether this observation is essential for the Establishment Clause validity of 
the tax-exemption, Walz also notes that the property tax exemption applies to a broad class 
of charitable organizations. 397 U.S. at 672-73. 
88. For the most developed argument in support of churches organizing as a dual 
structure under section 501(c)(3) and section 50l(c)(4), see Douglas H. Cook, The 
Politically Active Church, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 457 (2004). 
89. 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983). 
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altemative.90 Section 501(c)(4) organizations are devoted to the broad purpose 
of promoting "social welfare."91 The primary difference is that donations to 
tax-exempt 501(c)(4) organizations do not qualify for the charitable deduction, 
but the restrictions on lobbying also do not apply, and the prohibition on 
political campaign activity under the regulations is not absolute.92 
This alternative, however, fails for at least two reasons. First, the extent to 
which a 501(c)(4) organization can engage in political activity otherwise 
prohibited under section 501(c)(3) is unclear and disputed. The problem begins 
with how the regulations interpret the statute. A 501(c)(4) organization must be 
"operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare," but the statute 
contains no express prohibitions against lobbying or political campaign 
activity, as does section 501(c)(3).93 Pushing the boundaries of interpretive 
flexibility, the regulations define "exclusively" as "primarily."94 They then 
invoke nearly the same language in section 501(c)(3) and state: "The promotion 
of social welfare does not include direct or indirect participation or intervention 
in political campaigns on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public 
office."95 The implied conclusion is that a 501(c)(4) organization can engage in 
political campaign activity otherwise prohibited under section 501(c)(3) if the 
organization's primary activity is the promotion of social welfare.96 The courts 
have not defined what measure of political campaign activity the statute allows 
90. 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(As was the case with TWR, the Church may form a related organization under 
section 501(c)(4) of the Code .... Such organizations are exempt from taxation; 
but unlike their section 50l(c)(3) counterparts, contributions to them are not 
deductible .... Although a section 501(c)(4) organization is also subject to the 
ban on intervening in political campaigns, ... it may form a political action 
committee ('PAC') that would be free to participate in political campaigns.). 
91. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006). "Social welfare" is one meaning assigned to 
"charitable" under section 501(c)(3). See Treas. Reg. § 1.50J(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (as amended in 
1990). 
92. See l.R.C. § 50J(c)(4) (2006); Treas. Reg.§ 1.50J(c)(4)-1 (as amended in 1990). 
See generally HOPKINS, supra note 15, § 1.4. 
93. I.R.C. § 50J(c)(4) (2006). 
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.50J(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1990). 
95. Treas. Reg. § 1.50l(c)(4)-1(a)(2)(ii) (as amended in 1990). See also Gregory L. 
Colvin & Miriam Galston, Report of Task Force on Section 501 (c)(4) and Politics, 39 
EXEMPT 0RG. TAX REV. 432, 433 (2003) 
(Neither the code nor the regulations describe what activities constitute direct or 
indirect campaign intervention or participation for 501(c)(4)s. Rev. Rul. 81-95, 
1981-1 C.B. 332, the only 'recent' precedential authority, implies that campaign 
activities for purposes of 50l(c)(3) organizations will also be campaign activities 
for 50I(c)(4)s because it cites 501(c)(3) rulings for examples of such activities.). 
96. The court in Branch Ministries misses this implied conclusion, finding that the ban 
is complete and suggesting that a 501(c)(4) organization would need to form a separate 
political action committee. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). See also Rev. Rul. 81-95, 1981-1 C.B. 332 (1981). 
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and commentators widely disagree.97 
More important, while this alternative is available for certain types of 
political campaign activity involving the use of funds, it fails when applied to 
expression within the community. The problem is one of severability. The law 
requires a careful separation between the 50l(c)(3) organization and the related 
50l(c)(4) organization.98 This separation is nearly impossible in the context of 
a sermon or other teaching within the faith community. A pastor, rabbi, or 
imam cannot announce that part of the message speaks for the 501(c)(4) 
organization. The exempt and non-exempt activities are inseparably 
intertwined. Although the 501(c)(4) alternative would allow a church to 
purchase a political advertisement in a newspaper (Branch Ministries), or other 
uses of funds where the activity is severable from the 50l(c)(3) organization, 
this alternative fails where the issue is the community's own discourse.99 
B. THE COURTS, CONGRESS, AND A RELIGIOUS EXEMPTION 
The inadequacy of these alternatives suggests the need for a limited 
exemption to the prohibition as it applies to religious congregations. When 
government grants a religious exemption, it carves out either a partial or 
complete exception to a generally applicable and otherwise valid law to protect 
the values of free exercise. 100 Government might grant a religious exemption 
under three different models. 101 Under the constitutional model, judges grant 
exemptions as a matter of constitutional law. These exemptions represent the 
minimum level of protection required by the Constitution as interpreted by the 
97. Comparing 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) organizations, Hopkins concludes: "Neither 
may, to any appreciable degree, participate or intervene in any political campaign on behalf 
of or in opposition to any candidate for public office." HOPKINS, supra note 15, § 12.4. Cook 
goes so far as to suggest that a church might devote 49% of its resources to otherwise 
prohibited political campaign activity and still satisfy the regulations. Cook, supra note 88, 
at 464. 
98. Branch Ministries. 211 F.3d at 143 ("[T]he related 501(c)(4) organization must be 
separately incorporated; and it must maintain records that will demonstrate that tax-
deductible contributions to the Church have not been used to support the political activities 
conducted by the 501(c)(4) organization's political action arm."). See also Miriam Galston, 
Civic Renewal and the Regulation ofNonprojits. 13 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 289,371-72 
(2004). 
99. Cook proposes that a church might organize as a 50l(c)(4) organization and have a 
separate 50l(c)(3) organization for distinct activities that do not involve prohibited political 
activity (such as evangelism or a Sunday School ministry). Cook, supra note 88. If Cook's 
proposal satisfies the severability requirements-and it is not clear that it does-then it 
seems that it does so only at the cost of including much activity within the 501(c)(4) 
organization that might otherwise qualify under section 50l(c)(3). 
100. Although outside the scope of this Article, the occasion for granting an exemption 
depends on a conception of what "neutrality" toward religion requires. See generally 
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 
DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990). 
101. These models are suggested by Eugene Volokh, A Common-Law Model for 
Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465 (1999). 
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Supreme Court. The legislature plays no role; rather, the courts have the first 
and final say. The Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder that the Free Exercise 
Clause required an exemption for Amish parents from the state's mandatory 
education law is an example of this model. 102 While it affords the ·greatest 
protections for minorities and gives federal courts the power to review state 
action, it excludes the legislature from a decisionmaking process that often 
requires balancing important policy concerns. 
The common law model gives courts the power to decide in the first 
instance, under a standard and procedure pre-determined by statute, but the 
legislature reserves the final say for itself. This model is currently in place 
under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). 103 The Court's recent 
decision in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Benejicente Uniao do Vegetal, 
allowing members of a church to receive communion by drinking a substance 
banned under the Controlled Substances Act, is an example of this model. 104 If 
Congress objects to the Court's decision, it retains the power of legislative 
override. This model draws on the unique strengths of both the judiciary and 
the legislature, combining the responsiveness and protections of the courts with 
the legislature's ability to balance competing policy concerns. Minorities do not 
have the same protection, however, since Congress can choose to override a 
judicial decision. Moreover, the Court has ruled that the law does not reach the 
states. 105 
Finally, under the statutory model the legislature has the first and final say 
in granting religious exemptions. The exemption to the Controlled Substances 
Act for the use of peyote by the Native American Church is an example. 106 This 
model gives the legislature the ability to balance competing policy concerns. 
Exemptions under this model, however, may be less likely on account of 
legislative inertia, minorities may have the least protection, 107 and power over 
the states is limited. 
Most scholars who are critical of the prohibition on political campaign 
intervention as it applies to churches have looked to the courts for an 
exemption, 108 either under the constitutional or common law models. Both 
102. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
103. 42 u.s.c. § 2000bb (2006). 
104. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 126 
S. Ct. 1211 (2006). 
105. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (concluding that the statute was not a valid 
exercise of congressional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
106. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (2006). In 1994, Congress extended the exemption to all 
members of every recognized Indian tribe. 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(b )(I) (2006); American Indian 
Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125. 
107. But see Louis Fisher, Nonjudicial Safeguards for Religious Liberty, 70 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 31 (2001) (arguing that the political process has done a better job at protecting 
politically weak minorities than have the courts). 
108. See, e.g., Gaffney, supra note 13; Johnson, supra note 13; Kemmitt, supra note 
13; Michelle O'Connor, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Exactly what Rights Does 
2007] STANFORD LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 318 
means of redress, however, are unrealistic in light of previous Court rulings. 
Employment Division v. Smith 109 nearly precludes an exemption under the Free 
Exercise Clause. In Smith the Court largely rejected the constitutional model 
for granting religious exemptions. The respondents in this case lost their jobs 
because they ingested peyote as part of a religious ceremony. 110 The state 
subsequently denied their application for unemployment benefits on the 
grounds that their employer fired them for misconduct under the state's drug 
laws. 111 The Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the Constitution does 
not require an exemption to a generally applicable and otherwise valid law. 112 
Allowing an exemption where the law does not target religious exercise, the 
Court explained, would allow a person "by virtue of his beliefs, 'to become a 
law unto himself. "'113 Since the prohibition on political campaign activity 
under 50l(c)(3) applies to all charitable organizations and does not target 
religion, Smith precludes an exemption under the Free Exercise Clause. 114 
It is also unlikely that the Court would grant an exemption under the 
RFRA. 115 Congress passed RFRA with the express aim of restoring the rule in 
Sherbert v. Verner, 116 which applied strict scrutiny under the First Amendment 
where a generally applicable law infringed on religious practice. 117 Formerly 
under Sherbert, and now under RFRA, the government must show that it has a 
compelling state interest that justifies a law or policy infringing on the free 
exercise of religion. Although the Court struck down RFRA against the states 
and refused to adopt its standard as an interpretation of what the Free Exercise 
Clause requires, 118 the Court has affirmed the statute's applicability in the 
federal context. 119 Nonetheless, the Court's past insistence that the government 
has a compelling interest in the uniform application of tax laws leaves little 
it 'Restore' in the Federal Tax Context?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 321 (2004). 
109. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
110. !d. at 874. 
111. /d. 
112. !d. at 879-80. 
113. !d. at 885 (citations omitted). 
114. The Court attempted to distinguish previous cases where it had granted 
exemptions under generally applicable laws with the contrived claim that these cases 
represented a "hybrid situation," where the free exercise claim connected to some other 
constitutional right. See id. at 881-82. Among other problems, the Court did not explain why 
the presence of another constitutional right, present in many cases, created the grounds for an 
exemption. A hybrid claim could be made in this case since political speech is also at stake. 
The Court, however, was less interested in opening an alternative means of relief than it was 
in attempting to avoid directly overruling itself. 
115. For a detailed assessment of this question, see O'Connor, supra note 108. 
116. 374 U.S. 398 (1963), overruled in part by Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990). Sherbert required courts to apply strict scrutiny where state action infringed on 
the free exercise of religion. !d. 
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5) (2006). 
118. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
119. Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 126 
S. Ct. 1211 (2006). 
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hope that courts would grant an exemption. 120 In the seminal case, United 
States v. Lee, the Court concluded: "Because the broad public interest in 
maintaining a sound tax system is of such a high order, religious belief in 
conflict with the payment oftaxes affords no basis for resisting the tax."I21 
The only viable source for a religious exemption is Congress, under the 
statutory model. Wanting the finality and breadth of a constitutional decision, 
or perhaps unduly favoring judicial solutions, legal scholars who criticize the 
prohibition often lament this situation. Nonetheless, each model for granting a 
religious exemption has its own strengths. One particular strength of the 
statutory model is that it allows the legislature to balance competing policy 
concerns. Any decision to grant exemptions will require this balancing, but in 
some cases the importance of competing policy concerns and the potential 
reach of the exemption make a statutory model especially appropriate. In 0 
Centro the Court granted a religious exemption for members of a Christian 
Spiritist sect based in Brazil, with approximately 130 members in the United 
States. 122 In contrast, a partial exemption for faith communities to the section 
50l(c)(3) prohibition against political campaign activity would have vastly 
greater impact, implicating the government's "weighty interests"123 in 
regulating the system of campaign finance. The United States has more than 
353,000 religious congregations124 with a total annual revenue well over $80 
billion. 125 Congress is well-suited for the task of carving out an exemption, 
while at the same time keeping intact those aspects of the prohibition which the 
campaign finance rationale demands. While one might discern an eagerness on 
the part of the Court to close the door to religious exemptions, Employment 
120. The Court would also have to find that the prohibition places a substantial burden 
on faith communities. Although I argue that the 501(c)(4) alternative does not alleviate the 
burdens on religious congregations, the Court's opinion in Regan v. Taxation with 
Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983), and the D.C. Circuit's decision in Branch 
Ministries v. Rosotti, 211 F.3d 137, 143 (D.C. Cir. 2000), both suggest that the Court may be 
reluctant to follow this path. 
121. 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982). See also 0 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1223; Hernandez v. 
Comm'r, 490 U.S. 689, 699-700 (1989), criticized by Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 19 (1989); Bob Jones Univ. v. 
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603-604 (1983), criticized by Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990). In Lee the Court applied strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause and 
Congress required the same standard under RFRA. Lee, 455 U.S. 252. The Court has tended 
to apply the test in the same way in each context. See, e.g., 0 Centro, 126 S. Ct. at 1220-21 
(looking to previous constitutional cases for guidance in applying strict scrutiny under 
RFRA). The statute, in fact, encourages this approach by citing previous constitutional cases 
as examples of the standard it adopts. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(l) (2006). In general, however, 
there is reason to think that the judiciary might be more willing to grant an exemption under 
the common law model than under the constitutional model, given the possibility of a 
legislative override. 
122. 546 U.S. 418, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006). 
123. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976). 
124. INDEP. SECTOR, supra note 84, at 3. 
125. !d. at 4. 
2007] STANFORD LAW AND POLICY REVIEW 320 
Division v. Smith in fact is better read as inviting Congress to play this very 
role.'26 
C. REDRAWING THE LINES 
Drawing an exemption for religious congregations requires balancing the 
burden that the current prohibition places on faith communities with legitimate 
policy concerns underlying the prohibition, particularly the government's 
strong interest in regulating campaign finance. The vast number of religious 
congregations, the magnitude of revenue they generate, and the near absence of 
government oversight are strong reasons for regulating the use of tax-exempt 
funds in this context. This rationale, however, does not support the broad and 
absolute prohibition now in place. The current prohibition restricts the passage 
of funds, but it also interferes with the practices whereby a religious 
community discerns how to live out its faith in the world. This interference 
comes from both substantive restrictions in the law and the chilling effect this 
law has on account of a vague standard, a severe penalty, and uncertain 
enforcement. 
An exemption for churches to the general prohibition on political campaign 
intervention should come in the form of a bright-line rule. One reason is to give 
government officials less room for subjective judgments that determine what a 
church can say and do. Consistent with a long tradition of government reticence 
to interfere with religion, under the Free Exercise Clause and beyond, the IRS 
should adopt a standard that limits the extent to which judgments are based on 
the "facts and circumstances" of each particular case. Adopting a bright-line 
rule would increase the likelihood that church leaders can discern with 
confidence where the IRS will draw the lines. Even if the current standard is 
more narrow than often perceived, the inability of church leaders to predict 
how the IRS will apply the standard has had a chilling effect among many 
congregations. Finally, a bright-line rule has the advantage of limiting the 
occasions of governmental intrusion that follow in the course of the IRS simply 
trying to determine whether or not a violation of the standard has occurred. 
Since the current standard is based on the "facts and circumstances" of each 
particular case, 127 reaching a conclusion may often require a lengthy and 
intrusive investigation. Of course, the trade-off in adopting a bright-line rule is 
that in almost all cases-and the proposal I suggest is no exception-the rule · 
126.494 U.S. 872,890(1990) 
(Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement 
in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process .... [A] 
society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be 
expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well .... But to say that 
a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is ... desirable, is not to say 
that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its 
creation can be discerned by the courts.). 
127. I.R.S. Fact Sheet, supra note 5. 
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will fail to map perfectly the underlying policy rationales. The rule may sweep 
more broadly or narrowly than the rationales suggest, at some points even 
producing inconsistencies, but in this case the advantages outweigh any costs. 
The exemption I have in mind attempts to remedy the primary problem 
with the current prohibition against political campaign intervention: the effect it 
has in limiting engagement, discussion, and discernment within faith 
communities on the great moral and political issues of the day. As discussed 
earlier, a standard that defines political campaign intervention as "any and all 
activities that favor or oppose one or more candidates for public office,"128 
whether direct or indirect, 129 belies any assurances by the IRS that churches are 
free to engage in issue advocacy. At some point, as the All Saints example 
shows, the IRS may decide that certain strong positions on the issues are in fact 
favoring a political candidate. This judgment, however, is not for the 
government to make. 
To remedy this problem, Congress should amend section 50l(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code to exclude from the meaning of political campaign 
intervention the content of any sermon, homily, teaching, or other oral 
presentation made in the course of a regular church meeting. 130 This exemption 
would only apply to faith communities; 131 it would not apply to other religious 
organizations. All Saints Episcopal and Thomas Road Baptist are included; 
Focus on the Family and the Interfaith Alliance are not. Although this 
limitation requires a distinction between a "church" and other religious 
organizations, the tax code already contemplates this distinction in excepting 
churches from the filing requirement for tax-exempt status. 132 Furthermore, the 
exemption is limited to oral communications; written handouts, voter 
scorecards, and other forms of written communication are not covered. Finally, 
the exemption is limited to regular church meetings. 133 It does not extend to 
128. !d. 
129. Treas. Reg.§ l.50l{c)(3)-l(b)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1990). 
130. A current bill in Congress, the Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act of 
2005, H.R. 235, 109th Cong. (2006), would provide a similar exemption. 
131. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(l)(A)(i) (2006); I.R.C. § 508(c){l)(A) (2006). 
132. I.R.C. § 508(c)(l)(A) (2006). 
133. The application of this rule to sermons originally delivered to the congregation, 
but also conveyed through the media, raises some challenges. Exempting sermons in this 
context would invite abuse. The easiest rule to apply would not extend the exemption to 
cover any oral communication aimed outside the community and that is otherwise prohibited 
under section 501(c)(3). At the same time, many people for different reasons "participate" in 
the life of a faith community through the media, whether by the internet, radio, or television. 
An alternative and less stringent rule might allow the conveyance where it is not distributed 
to the public for the purpose of influencing an upcoming election. Clear violations of this 
alternative rule would include repackaging a sermon as a paid infomercial or purchasing 
media time during an election cycle and outside the congregation's regular practice. Internet 
streaming poses another challenge. Compared to a radio program or a commercial on TV, 
however, the potential influence of a sermon available over the internet is relatively small, 
especially since the user must make an active choice to access the material. 
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anything the church sponsors, nor would it cover a special political event for 
church members scheduled a few weeks before the election. 
This proposal has many strengths. Foremost, it addresses the primary 
problem with the current prohibition, lifting any restraint on the issues a 
religious leader might address, the intensity with which an issue is discussed, 
and the degree to which one issue is balanced with others. The exemption is 
also relatively narrow. The ads purchased in Branch Ministries, 134 donations to 
political campaigns, and public campaign rallies in the church are all ruled out. 
The restrictions on voter scorecards and candidate appearances remain. In 
addition, the use of tax-exempt funds is restricted Of course, almost any oral or 
written communication made by a religious leader who draws a paycheck from 
the congregation conceivably carries a price tag. The monetary value of the 
words in a sermon, however, is de minimis. If a religious congregation wants to 
use funds in a way not covered by this exemption, then it may have recourse to 
the alternative organizational structure suggested by the court in Branch 
Ministries v. Rossotti. 135 Recall that a 50l(c)(4) organization is a separate entity 
governed by a more relaxed rule concerning political campaign activity. The 
activities of the 50l(c)(4) must remain separate from the related 50l(c)(3) 
organization. Some activities, however, such as sermons and other church 
teaching, are not amenable to this arrangement because they are not severable 
from the activities of the church as a 50l(c)(3) organization. 
At the same time-as is the case with any bright-line rule-the proposal 
has some limitations as well. For many supporters of the prohibition, the fact 
that this exemption allows for political endorsements from the pulpit will be 
troubling. The need for a clear rule, however, demands as much. If the 
exemption did not extend to political endorsements, then the IRS would be left 
with the same subjective task of determining when a sermon effectively 
amounts to an endorsement. Disallowing only "express endorsements" is less 
vague, but still raises problems. Would a pastor who ended his sermon by 
asking the congregation whether a true Christian could ever vote for a person 
who did not commit to overturning Roe v. Wade make an express endorsement? 
More important, whether the exemption does or does not allow for 
endorsements matters much less once the decision is made that a church will 
not violate the prohibition by addressing issues of moral/political concern. 
Discerning where a religious leader stands in some cases will be obvious. The 
decision to support a political candidate from the pulpit may be an unwise 
choice reflecting a failure to recognize the range of issues at stake and the 
threat such support might pose to the integrity of a ministry. In fact, research 
indicates that a solid majority of voters do not want clergy to discuss electoral 
politics from the pulpit. 136 Nonetheless the faith community-and not the 
134. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
135. Id. 
136. THE PEW RESEARCH CTR. FOR THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS, 
POLITICS: THE AMBIVALENT MAJORITY (2000), available at 
RELIGION AND 
http://peop1e-
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government-should make this decision. 
Furthermore, extending the exemption to sermons and not scorecards 
allows for some inconsistencies. A sermon might communicate the same 
material as a printed voter guide. While the exemption would cover the former, 
it would not cover the latter. Drawing the line here, however, is reasonable 
given the likelihood that voter guides will circulate outside the faith community 
and exert significant influence. Any exemption will have to make compromises 
at some point. 
Admittedly, the account of faith in Part II as both total and communal 
might well push in favor of lifting the prohibition altogether. The Christian 
tradition, in particular, has an understanding of its "prophetic" role in society 
and questions a strong public/private distinction. The demands of faith, 
however, must balance with other ends such as society's need to regulate the 
political process. This proposal preserves this end while also lifting an undue 
restraint on faith. 
press.org/reports/display.php3?ReportiD=32. 
